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Abstract—We design and implement Publication Chain (Pub-
Chain), a decentralized open-access publication platform built
on decentralized and distributed technologies of blockchain and
IPFS peer-to-peer file sharing systems. The existing publication
platforms are mostly owned by publishers with profit as their
central goal. Instead of promoting widespread knowledge shar-
ing, access to publications on these platforms is often on a fee
basis. The stakeholders (the people who are doing the real work),
including the authors, reviewers, and readers, do not derive
financial gain, from these platforms. Indeed, authors sometimes
have to pay exorbitant page charges to have their papers
published, and readers have to pay membership fee or other fees
to access the papers. On these platforms, you have to pay before
you are allowed to “stand on the shoulders of giants”; but the
giants do not get paid, neither do the gate-keepers (the reviewer).
PubChain is a decentralized publication platform, where the
ownerships of the published papers, reviews, and comments
on the papers, belong to the authors, readers and reviewers,
rather than a central third party that exploits the free services
and contributions of others. On PubChain, key stakeholders
are incentivized to participate in a meaningful and substantive
manner by earning credits and rewards through self-motivated
interactions. Pubchain makes use of blockchain technology to set
up an incentive scheme to encourage participations by authors,
readers and reviewers. No central party owns Pubchain (just
like nobody owns the Bitcoin blockchain). We have performed
simulations to investigate our proposed incentive scheme and
implemented a prototype of PubChain to demonstrate its key
concepts.
Index Terms—Publications, Decentralization, Blockchain,
Peer-to-Peer Networks, IPFS
I. INTRODUCTION
Publications of research results are an important activity
to disseminate new knowledge. “Standing on the shoulders
of giants” is a vivid expression that points out that new
discoveries and innovations are usually built on prior work
by others [1], [2]. Researchers thrive on free exchange of
information.
A. Drawbacks and Limitations of Existing Publication Plat-
forms of Publishers
To date, the most successful venues for academic paper
publication are journals and magazines owned by large en-
trenched publishers, such as Nature Publishing Group, Institute
of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Association for
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Computing Machinery (ACM), Elsevier of RELX Group and
Springer-Verlag. These publishers publish a huge number of
research papers every year and their journals and magazines
are platforms on which researchers exchange their latest
research results and where latest research breakthroughs are
announced. Despite their success, these publication platforms
have significant drawbacks and limitations from the standpoint
of key players—authors, reviewers, and readers—that matter
most.
1) Pay Wall: The power to publish, store and share aca-
demic literature is concentrated in the hands of a few dominant
publishers. These publishers are for-profit outfits. They charge
authors for publishing papers on their venues and charge
readers for accessing the papers. Conferences organized by
some publishers often charge exorbitant registration fees for
conference attendance, and outrageous sums of money for
page charge for pages that do not incur much additional
cost on their electronic platforms. They get away with these
exploitations because they can. They have built up their brands
over the years.
But who help them build and maintain their brands? Well,
they leverage the free service of editors and reviewers to main-
tain the quality of the publications. In most businesses, workers
who do work receive compensation rather than the other way
round. Publication business is an exception—publishers charge
both the workers (the authors) as well as the customers (the
readers) and receive free services from both the workers and
the customers (the authors and readers themselves often serve
as the reviewers).
Their charges can be quite expensive to the extent that
only large organizations, such as corporations, research in-
stitutions and universities, can afford the fees to access their
publications. The pay wall put up by the publishers excludes
small organizations and individuals from accessing the latest
research publications. These publishers stand in the way of
knowledge dissemination and the pay wall prevents a level
playing field among researchers.
2) Information Island: The authors are forced to transfer
the copyrights of their papers to the publishers. The publishers
typically do not mutually share their literature resources. This
gives rise to information islands with unsynchronized contents.
There are many intrinsic disadvantages associated with such
isolated information islands. Readers and researchers lacking
resources will have difficulty getting a complete set of past
papers unless they subscribe to all these publishers. These
islands are hurdles to knowledge dissemination.
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23) Disintegration of Peer Review Process: Peer reviews of
papers should be performed by experts with the same level
of competence as the authors of the papers in their particular
field. The peer review process is crucial to maintaining paper
quality. As a rule of thumb, journals and conferences with a
rigorous peer review process and with a low paper acceptance
rate are considered to be more prestigious by readers and
authors.
With the growth of research participants, research papers are
also growing exponentially. It is getting increasingly difficult
to find quality reviewers to review the large number of
papers. Competent reviewers are researchers themselves. As
researchers, they need to balance their time between reviewing
others papers and doing their own research. Unless these
papers are directly related to their current research topics,
they have little incentive to do the review, even if they have
the technical expertise to do so. Paper review is a form of
technical auditing as far as scientific papers are concerned.
When accountants perform financial auditing for corpora-
tions and organizations, they often charge a large sum of
money for their service, and as such they are obligated to
do a professional job that meets a certain minimum quality
threshold. Otherwise, the accountants would not receive future
jobs. When reviewers perform technical auditing, reviewers
receive zero compensation, and the quality of review varies
much from reviewer to reviewer. There are no incentives
other than the conscience of the reviewers to meet certain
minimum quality target. Arguably, serious technical auditing
can be a lot more time-consuming than financial auditing. Why
should technical auditing be free? Are scientists worth less
than accountants?
Without proper incentives, there is little reason for reviewers
to spend time on paper review. As a result, because of paper
explosion, many reviews are quite shallow in nature, even for
prestigious venues such as IEEE. Many senior researchers
(e.g., professors) may relegate the responsibility of paper
review to junior novice researchers (e.g., beginning graduate
students of the professors) who at least have the incentive
to review papers as part of their learning process—some of
them probably have no choice because their superiors ask
them to do the job. Where did the money—page charges,
membership fees—go? Did any go to those responsible for
quality assurance?
B. Other Publication Platforms and Services
Literature search and citation index services, such as web of
science and google scholar, can partially overcome the infor-
mation island effect. Papers from multiple publishers can be
listed and their citations can be indexed. Since these services
do not really publish papers, they still cannot overcome the
handicaps of pay wall and peer review disintegration.
To destroy the pay wall of publishers, Free Open Access
aims to make academic literature a free public resource
on a global scale. For example, the arXiv preprint system
allows authors to upload their papers for free access by
all researchers. By the year of 2014, more than 1 million
articles have been uploaded on arXiv [3]. The founder of
arXiv, physicist Paul Kingsbagh, won the 2002 MacArthur
award for his contribution to Free Open Access. Although
Free Open Access platforms allow everyone to access research
outputs freely and easily, they still suffer from peer review
disintegration. In fact, arXiv does not even have a peer review
process. Low-quality papers abound on Free Open Access
platform. As of today, papers published on Free Open Access
platforms do not earn the same prestige that they earn on the
publication platforms of Publishers.
All publication platforms today are centralized—they are
owned or managed by a single organization. As a conse-
quence, they are prone to single points of failure—there is no
guarantee that the organization will never close the access to
the database. The power to publish, store and share academic
literature is concentrated in the hands of publishers and owners
of open-access platforms.
C. How does PubChain Incentivize Participants
Publication Chain (PubChain) aims to overcome the lim-
itations of the current publication platform. PubChain is a
decentralized publication platform, where authors, readers and
reviewers are incentivized to participate in a meaningful and
substantive manner. In particular, these key players can earn
credits and rewards through self-motivated interactions. The
assets of PubChain are owned by these key players, not by a
separate profit-focused publisher. PubChain does not own the
copyrights of the papers; the authors retain their copyrights.
PubChain is not a central authority. The authors do not even
need permissions to PubChain for publishing their papers.
Papers posted by authors are automatically distributed to the
distributed IPFS file sharing system and are registered in a
decentralized blockchain.
In the following, we review the status quo of existing
publication platforms from the standpoints of the incentives for
the authors, the reviewers, and the readers. For this purpose,
IEEE is taken as a representative of publisher platforms,
and arXiv is taken as a representative of Free Open Access
platforms.
Incentives for Authors:
1) Visibility: The most important motivation for authors
is that their papers are downloaded and read by many.
This is successfully achieved by IEEE already. It is also
achieved to some extent by arXiv given its open access
nature.
2) Prestige and Recognition by Peers: Well written papers
with good results are recognized by peers. This is
successfully achieved by IEEE already. As of today, the
quality of papers in arXiv varies widely because of the
lack of a review process. Having an arXiv paper by itself
does not command recognition by peers.
3) Time Stamping: Claiming the first to do something.
This is achieved by IEEE to some extent; however the
time stamps are not immediate. Time stamping is more
immediate with arXiv.
4) Low Cost: This not achieved by IEEE. Publishing in
IEEE venues is costly. This is achieved by arXiv.
5) Continuous Improvement of Publications: Authors can
submit revised versions based on the feedback and
3reviews on the platform. If this can be achieved, re-
search publications, like software, will have a life of
its own in that it can be continuously improved. Papers
published in IEEE go through a few reviewers only. And
once accepted and published, the paper publications are
permanent. arXiv allows authors to submit new versions
of the same paper. However, there is a lack of feedback
by reviewers that add quality to the new versions.
6) Financial Incentive: To most authors, making money
from publications probably ranks low as an incentive.
That said, as far as we know, IEEE (and other publishers)
does not pay authors of significant papers that add much
prestige to their journals and magazines. Occasionally,
prize paper awards come with only a small token amount
of money as a goodwill gesture. There are no financial
incentive schemes on open-access platforms either.
Incentives for Reviewers:
1) Reward: Good reviews should be rewarded financially or
rewarded by other means. Paper review is an auditing
process. In other economic endeavors, for the audit of
the financial health of a company, or the expenditure
of an R&D project, the auditing company typically
charges a large sum for the effort. Why should the
efforts of paper reviewers be free especially if most
reviewers do not gain recognition from the efforts?
Technical people have been exploited to a large extent
in that regard. IEEE certainly does not provide strong
incentives for reviewers to do a good job. Reviewers are
not participants on the arXiv platform.
Incentives for Readers:
1) Good and Relevant Papers: Readers, who are often
researchers themselves, want to find good and relevant
papers quickly. This is achieved by IEEE and arXiv.
2) Interactions with Authors and Reviewers: Readers can
obtain answers from the authors directly on the platform.
Each paper could also have an FAQ managed by the
author, but with contributions from the other readers
and reviewers. This are very little open interactions
and debates between readers, authors, and reviewers, on
IEEE and arXiv.
PubChain is designed to achieve the above incentives for
all stakeholders through an incentivized ecosystem.
II. SOLUTION OF PUBCHAIN
A. Design Concept
A central design concept of PubChain is to use blockchain
[4], [5] and off-chain peer-to-peer distributed file storage (i.e.,
InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) [6]) as building blocks to
decentralize the publication platform. Such decentralization
also means that there is no single central party that controls the
running of the platform. If properly designed, the decentralized
system can also be more robust than a centralized system given
its replication of data across multiple parties.
PubChain uses the IPFS system as the database system for
storing papers. IPFS is a distributed and decentralized storage
system consisting of a network of peer-to-peer nodes. The
techniques and features of IPFS can be found in [6]. With
IPFS, papers are content-addressed in the database. Authors
can back up their papers to the network and freely download
papers without the risk of single-point failure. The IPFS
repository is physically owned by all users and not by a single
entity.
PubChain exploits blockchain technology to confirm the
registration of the paper ownership, to track index citations,
and to incentivize participants. Blockchain is a distributed and
decentralized append-only ledger for digital assets. Data in
blockchain is replicated and shared among all the participants.
Past records are made tamper-resistant through its append-only
paradigm. There are many successful existing blockchain sys-
tems, e.g., Bitcoin [7], Ethereum [8]. We can reuse and modify
their software code to build the blockchain of PubChain.
The operation of PubChain blockchain is divided into two
consecutive phases, with the first phase being a temporary
phase before the final second phase takes over. In the first
phase, PubChain operates as a consortium blockchain using
the Proof-of-authority (PoA) consensus protocol [9]. In the
second phase, PubChain operates as a public blockchain using
the Proof-of-work (PoW) consensus protocol [7].
Fig. 1 gives an overview of the PubChain platform. There
are three entities in the platform: a group of publication
players, a blockchain system sustained by miners, an IPFS
system with distributed storage nodes. The blockchain system
and the IPFS system are the infrastructure of PubChain. A
network node can be a miner of blockchain or/and a storage
node of IPFS. Blockchain miners run the distributed consensus
protocol to maintain the data on blockchain. In the consortium
blockchain phase, the miners are the super nodes that are
selected to run the PoA protocol. In the public blockchain
phase, the miners are the nodes that devote their computing
powers to solving hash puzzles of the blockchain. IPFS
storage nodes share their memory space for the distributed
and persistent storage for PubChain. Through a PubChain
interface, the publication players (i.e., authors, reviewers, and
readers) interact with the blockchain and IPFS systems in the
conduct of their activities on PubChain. We have developed
a PubChain system that combines blockchain and IPFS. We
will describe the system architecture of PubChain in Section
III.
When an author uploads his/her paper to PubChain, the pa-
per is time-stamped and registered on Pubchain as a permanent
record. The citation index for every paper is also tracked on
PubChain. Tokens are used to financially incentivize players to
engage in publication activities on PubChain and to incentivize
miners to sustain and maintain PubChain. We will elaborate
our proposed incentive mechanism in Section IV.
The tokens issued by PubChain are called PubCoins. Pub-
Chain is a non-profit project and we will not sell the issued
PubCoins through initial coin offering (ICO) and private
placements to any other entity to make money. PubCoins will
be distributed to all the participants as the rewards for their
contributions to the platform, rather than to the project team
or other organizations.
To endow PubCoin with real monetary value, we design
PubChain as a side chain of another parent chain whose
4query paper 
matadata
 from blockchain 
send 
transactions 
to blockchain
upload/download 
papers/reviews
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
block #100 block #101 block #102 block #103
Distributed 
File
Storage
System
(IPFS)
Blockchain 
system
PubChain 
Interface
PubChain 
Interface
PubChain 
Interface
PubChain 
Interface
Authors, Reviewers, Readers
Fig. 1. The overview of PubChain platform, where we have three entities: a group of publication players (authors, reviewers, readers), a blockchain system
sustained by miners, an IPFS system with distributed storage nodes.
tokens are in wide circulation and are considered to have real
monetary values, e.g., Bitcoin, Etherum, Bitcoin Cash. Using
the two-way pegging technique of side chain [10], we can
transfer the tokens on the parent chain to PubChain and vice
versa. This concept is illustrated in Fig. 2. The technical details
of two-way pegging and side chain can be found in [10]. At the
beginning stage, PubChain operates separately from the parent
chain, and PubCoin has no real monetary values. Donation to
PubChain can be injected into PubChain from a parent chain
using two-way pegging, and PubChain will then operate as a
side chain after that. We discuss the details about the financial
model of PubChain in the Section II.B.
B. Financial Model
With the crypto-currencies provided by blockchain systems,
PubChain aims to establish the following financial model for
the world of publications.
A certain amount of PubChain tokens (PubCoins) are issued
to the participants on PubChain. Corresponding to the two
phases of blockchain systems, the establishment of the value
over PubCoins is also divided into the following two phases:
• Phase I (Consortium blockchain phase): In this phase,
as a bootstrap incentive scheme, a certain amount of
new PubCoins is issued to each PubChain user when
he/she first registers as a user. To endow PubCoins with
real monetary values, we adopt the two-way pegging
technique of side chain to transfer the values of other
cryptocurrencies (that already have real prices on the mar-
ket) to PubChian. On one parent chain, we lock a certain
amount of the cryptocurrency tokens to a special address
and we also send the simplified payment verification
(SPV) proof of this token-locked transaction to PubChain.
The cryptocurrency tokens owned by the special address
cannot be transferred to other address by spending: these
cryptocurrency tokens are simply a reserve to endow Pub-
Chain tokens with real monetary values. On PubChain,
the miners will package the transaction sent from the
parent chain into a block for broadcast to the whole
Pubchain network. Then, a block on PubChain issues a
number of PubCoins to the users of PubChain (with two-
way pegging, these issued PubCoins can be sent to the
parent chain to unlock the locked cryptocurrencies on
the parent chain). In this manner, the issued PubCoins
are linked to the locked cryptocurrencies on the parent
chains; the value of the PubCoins are endorsed and
determined by the total amount of the locked tokens.
• Phase II (Public chain phase): In this phase, a certain
amount of PubCoins are issued in each block. These
5Parent 
Chain
Side 
Chain
Two Way 
Pegging
Fig. 2. Illustration of the concept of side chain and its two-way pegging.
issued tokens will be given as rewards to the miner
as well as to the authors and reviewers that contribute
to PubChain. How the rewards are distributed among
the players will be explained later. The amount of the
rewarded PubCoins in each block is constant and does
not vary from block to block. This means that the
total amount of tokens issued increases over time and
is unlimited. No other cryptocurrency is transferred to
PubChain anymore in Phase II. PubChain is operated as
a decentralized central bank that constantly issues new
tokens to adapt to the expansion of the whole economy
on the platform.
Fig. 3 illustrates the above two-phase financial model of the
PubChain system. A few remarks are as follows:
• There is a important difference between the cryptocur-
rency endorsement mechanism in Phase I of PubCoin and
the ICO activities of other projects. Using the two-way
pegging technique, Pubchain cryptocurrency endorsement
can guarantee the cryptocurrencies transferred to Pub-
Chain belong to the entire PubChain network rather than
to a single entity (i.e., not controlled by one entity);
nobody can embezzle these locked cryptocurrencies and
spend them. For ICO, there is a high risk that the insti-
tution or individual controlling the project will abscond
with the raised cryptocurrencies.
• Phase I is similar to the Bretton Woods system (the
system for monetary and exchange rate management
established in 1944 [11]) where the US dollar is linked to
gold (all involved countries confirmed the official price
of 35 US dollars per ounce of gold in January 1944) and
the currencies of other countries maintain fixed exchange
rates with the US dollar. Under Bretton Woods system,
the credit and the value of the US dollar is supported by
gold.
• The purpose of Phase I is to inject real monetary val-
ues into PubCoins to incentivize participants to conduct
publication activities over PubChain. This phase is very
important for cold-booting PubChain. As more active
participants join PubChain and as the value of PubChain
to publication players are demonstrated, more participants
can be brought in, whether they are incentivized by
parent chain
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Fig. 3. The illustration of the two-phase financial model of the PubChain
system.
money or by the value of PubChain as a publication
venue. At some point, a vibrant ecosystem will be es-
tablished, and there will be no need to inject the values
of other crypto-currencies into PubChain. PubChain then
operates normally with its financial value tied to its use
value: PubChain then enters Phase II of its operating
model.
• In Phase II, the amount of the rewarded PubCoins in
every block keeps constant all the time, which means
the total amount of tokens issued increases over time
and is unlimited. This is different from the token issuing
mechanism of Bitcoin that limits its total amount of
tokens. This implies the underlying financial models of
PubCoin and Bitcoin are different. Bitcoin is more like
gold, and its value comes from its scarcity; PubCoin is
more like a currency, and the issuer continues to issue
this currency to adapt to the gradual expansion the entire
economy: if more work is done (in this case, more
publications, more reviews, more readers participations),
more currency will be issued to support the increased
scale of the economy. Phase II is similar to the current
US dollar system after the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system the early 1970s.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OF PUBCHAIN
Recently, blockchain-based decentralized data storing and
sharing networks were investigated in [12]–[16]. PubChain has
6many technological similarities with these existing blockchain-
based decentralized data systems. One major difference of
PubChain, however, is that the data stored and shared on
PuhChain are very specific, i.e., papers. This difference adds
a set of special technical requirements to the design and
implementation of PubChain.
PubChain has the following technical requirements: 1)
Any node should be able to upload and share papers on
the platform. 2) The platform should provide scalable data
transmission and storage capabilities. 3) Nodes should be
incentivized to upload papers to PubChain to derive benefits
from the uploaded papers. 4) The platform should be able to
identify and evaluate the quality of papers. 5) The platform
does not keep ownership of papers.
In order to realize these technical requirements, PubChain
is built on a completely decentralized system architecture.
As shown in Fig. 4, the system architecture of PubChain
consists of four layers: blockchain layer, virtual machine layer,
routing layer and storage layer. Following the design principle
proposed in [17], this architecture decouples the control plane
(that consists of the blockchain and virtual machine layers) and
the data plane (consisting of the Routing and storage layers).
We describe the functions of the four layers in the following.
A. Blockchain Layer
The bottom layer is the blockchain layer. The Bitcoin-like
blockchain system is a tamper-proof distributed ledger that is
suitable for recording small data but not suitable for processing
big data. For the design of PubChain, the blockchain systems
are exploited to record the metadata of papers; the blockchain
systems also record the operation commands sent by the nodes
and enable consensus on the execution order of operations. In
a nutshell, the blockchain layer realizes a global state recorder
for the PubChain platform.
B. Virtual Machine Layer
Above the blockchain layer is the virtual machine layer.
The API provided by the script languages on the Bitcoin-like
blockchain systems is not Turing complete. The functional-
ities provided by them are very limited. For example, the
Bitcoin blockchain can only perform simple operations such
as issuing and recording transactions. For PubChain, the logic
functionalities reside in the more versatile virtual machine
layer. We can define new operations in the virtual machine
layer without changing the underlying blockchain layer. The
virtual machine layer reads the recorded metadata of papers
and the operation commands from the blockchain layer and
executes these operations accordingly.
Our current reference implementation of PubChain uses the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) smart contract mechanism
[8] in its virtual machine layer. Since the EVM smart contract
is Turing complete, we can realize the functionalities required
by the PubChain platform and easily incorporate other new
functionalities as they arise. Another choice for the virtual
machine layer is the virtual chain mechanism proposed in [17].
We can also realize the logic of PubChain by predefining the
required operations using the technology of virtual chain. Al-
though virtual chain is not Turing complete, it is a lightweight
design whose advantages include better reliability, security and
performance.
C. Routing Layers
Above the virtual machine layer is the routing layer. The
main function of the routing layer is to allow the virtual
machine layer to obtain the addresses of papers in the storage
system. PubChain separates routing requests (i.e., how to
locate papers) from the actual storage of papers. This avoids
the need for PubChain to adopt a specific storage backend, al-
lowing the coexistence of multiple forms of storage backends,
including centralized database, commercial cloud service, and
peer-to-peer distributed file sharing systems (e.g., IPFS).
In the implementation of PubChain, a subset of publication
player nodes, blockchain miner nodes, IPFS storage nodes
forms a peer-to-peer network based on distributed hash table
(DHT) [18] for storing the routing files. When the virtual
machine layer sends an address resolution request to the
routing layer, the routing layer first looks for the corresponding
routing file according to the target hash value of the paper sent
by the virtual machine layer through the DHT mechanism.
With the routing file, we can then get the URL of the specific
storage locations (such as cloud service: https://, IPFS storage:
ipfs://)1. A data request is then initiated to the corresponding
storage system via the URL.
D. Storage Layer
The top level of the PubChain is the storage layer that stores
the actual data of papers. Each stored paper is signed by the
owner’s private key to claim its ownership. Because papers
are stored outside of the blockchain, PubChain can support
the storage of papers with any size and can use a variety
of storage backends. Nodes do not need to trust the storage
systems because they can verify the integrity of downloaded
paper in the virtual machine layer. Multiple forms of data
storage can be mounted to the storage layer. For example,
some large institutions (such as universities, companies) can
set up their own centralized databases to back up the papers
on PubChain for their own use. However, the decentralized
peer-to-peer IPFS storage system is always included to ensure
the accessibility of the papers.
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS OF PUBCHAIN
Papers on PubChain will attract large readership only if it
is a reputable publication platform. Authors and reviewers
contribute toward making PubChain a quality publication
platform by submitting high-quality papers and reviews. In that
light, effective incentive mechanisms to encourage substantive
and meaningful participation by authors and reviewers are a
1One paper can be stored in multiple storage systems to ensure its
availability. The IPFS system is always used to store papers for ensuring
free open access. If the URL of a cloud service is used, the access to the
paper is via a central server. If the URL of IPFS is used, the access to the
paper is via the DHT embedded in IPFS system.
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core part of Pubchain. In this section, we describe the incentive
mechanisms of PubChain2.
A. Incentive Mechanism to Authors
In Pubchain, an author submits her/his paper via a transac-
tion Tpost. The transaction Tpost includes meta-information
associated with the submitted paper, such as the authors
address on the blockchain, the papers IPFS address, title,
keywords, and the transaction hashes of papers cited by the
paper.
The author pays X PubCoins in the transaction of each
submitted paper. A fraction of a1X tokens, 0 < a1 < 1,
are allocated to areviewer bonus pool. The tokens in the
reviewer bonus pool are distributed to reviewers according to
the mechanism presented in Section IV.B. Another fraction of
a2X tokens, 0 < a2 < 1, a1 + a2 < 1 are given to the papers
cited by the submitted paper 3. The remaining (1− a1 − a2)X
tokens are taken as the transaction fees given to the miner that
records the transaction onto blockchain.
In the public-chain phase of PubChain, every mined block
contains a coinbase transaction that mints Y new PubCoin
tokens. Among these minted tokens, a fraction of b1Y tokens,
0 < b1 < 1, are released to the reviewer bonus pool, a fraction
of b2Y tokens, 0 < b2 < 1, b1+b2 < 1 are released to authors
as rewards according to the following reward distribution
mechanism, and the remaining (1− b1 − b2)Y tokens are
released to the miner of that block.
To incentivize authors to submit quality papers, rewards are
distributed to authors according to the review scores of their
papers. Specifically, when a new block is mined, the author
of paper i receives a reward of Gi PubCoins from the new
block, computed as follows:
Gi = b2Y × max (Si − λ, 0)∑
i
max (Si − λ, 0) (1)
2We focus on the incentive mechanism to publication players here. The
incentives to blockchain miners are the mining rewards and transactions fees.
Filecoins [19] are the incentive to IPFS storage nodes who share their storage
spaces.
3Only authors of cited papers having a registered account with PubChain
will be rewarded. Each Paper is identified by the hash of the transaction that
registered the paper on the blockchain.
where Si is the current review score of paper i (computation
of the current review score Si of paper i will be presented
in Section V.A), λ is a quality threshold for papers, the
summation of i is over all papers that were been published
on PubChain during the previous M block intervals. In other
words, a paper will be rewarded within a reward window of
M blocks after it is published on PubChain.
The review score Si of paper i is initialized to zero, Si = 0,
and thus max (Si − λ , 0) = 0 initially. With the threshold λ,
posting and overwhelming PubChain with low-quality papers
whose review score does not pick up over time will not be
rewarding. Furthermore, since X PubCoins are charged for
each posted paper, there is a disincentive for authors to submit
low-quality papers.
Besides receiving rewards from good reviews, a paper
can also receive rewards when it is cited by another paper.
Specifically if paper j cites K other papers that are also posted
on PubChain, a2X tokens paid by paper j will be given to
the authors of the K cited papers. Each cited paper i will
receive a2X/K tokens from paper j. In this way, if a paper
has a long lasting influence on other papers, it may continue
to receive rewards through the citation mechanism (i.e., long
after the review reward window has transpired, citation reward
may continue).
B. Incentive Mechanism to Reviewers
In Pubchain, a reviewer submits the review of a paper
by sending a transaction Treview to the blockchain. The
transaction Treview includes the hash of the transaction that
publishes the paper, the numerical score of the paper given
by the reviewer, and the blockchain address of the reviewer.
In addition to the numerical score, reviewers can also write
comments on papers. Insightful comments are useful to the
authors in terms of improving future versions of their papers;
they also let readers identify high-quality papers. The com-
ments on papers are stored on IPFS and their IPFS address are
included in the transaction Treview that is sent to PubChain
for record keeping.
We denote the review of paper i by reviewer j by Ri,j
∆
=
(Zi,j , Ci,j) where Zi,j is the numerical score and Ci,j is the
comments. PubChain treats the comments by reviewers as
some sort of a special paper that are reviewed by readers—
paper reviews are also reviewed, but with a numerical score
only. The score of review j depends on its review numerical
scores given by readers. Readers will not give high scores to
a paper review with only a numerical score without insightful
comments. Review j of paper i receives a reward of gi,j
PubCoins computed as follows:
gij = αF
max (Wi,j − λ, 0)∑
i,j
max (Wi,j − λ, 0) (2)
where Wi,j is the current average score of comment Ci,j , F
is the total reward in the review bonus pool during the current
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Fig. 5. Token flows of the incentive mechanism in PubChain.
block interval 4, α is a ratio (0 < α < 1) that governs how
much bonus in the current pool are distributed to reviewers
during this block interval, the summation of i and j is over
the comments recorded onto PubChain during the previous M
blocks. The bonus not used in the current block, (1 − α)F ,
will be kept in the pool for release in subsequent blocks.
To incentive miners to include review transactions into their
blocks, a fraction β  1 of the reward obtained by a review
gij (i.e. βgij tokens) is released to the miner who included this
review transaction into its block. Therefore, during each block
interval, βαF = β
∑
i,j gij tokens from the review bonus
pool are released to miners who included review transactions
associated with all reviews j in the past M blocks.
Fig. 5 illustrates the token flows associated with our incen-
tive mechanism. The incentive mechanism relies on the scores
that can objectively reflect the qualities of papers and reviews.
The next section will present a decentralized scoring system
that can prevent malicious nodes from tampering with scores.
V. DECENTRALIZED SCORING SYSTEM OF PUBCHAIN
The financial rewards of PubChain are issued to authors
and reviewers according to the scores of their papers and
their reviews. To earn more rewards, malicious nodes may
deliberately give scores that deviate from the true quality of
4In the consortium-chain phase of PubChain, F = (1− α)F ′ + a1XN ,
where F ′ is the total reward in the review bonus pool during the last block
interval, N is the number of the published papers and a1XN is the total
amount of the tokens paid by the published papers during this block interval.
In the public-chain phase of PubChain, F = (1− α)F ′ + a1XN + b1Y ,
where b1Y is the amount of tokens released to the review bonus pool by the
current block interval.
papers and reviews. Therefore, a decentralized scoring system
that can ensure objective scores in the presence of malicious
nodes is very important. In this section, we first propose a
decentralized scoring system to compute the scores of papers
and reviews. We then perform simulations to investigate the
integrity of the proposed decentralized scoring system.
A. Decentralized Scoring System
The effective score Wi,j of review Ri,j = (Zi,j , Ci,j) is
computed by averaging readers’ scores on Ri,j . If review Ri,j
has received scores from less than Nrs readers, its effective
score is fixed to Wi,j = 0; otherwise, the effective score Wi,j
of review Ri,j is obtained by excluding the highest and lowest
10% readers’ scores and then averaging the remaining scores.
To avoid conflict of interest, if a participant has submitted a
review of a paper, she/he cannot score the other reviews of the
same paper as a reader. In addition, to avoid score flooding,
a reader can at most score Nrc review comments of the same
paper 5. The effective score Wi,j of review Ri,j is for two
purposes. First, it is used in (??) to incentivize reviewers to
perform high-quality reviews. Second, it is used to compute
the effective score Si of paper i.
We employ the review results of paper i, encoded in the
form of {(Zi,j , Ci,j ,Wi,j)}j=1,2,··· to compute the review
5For implementation, we need a way to identify participants on PubChain
and associate each participant ID with a unique address on blockchain. To
achieve this, we can use the affiliation emails or ORCID IDs of the participants
as their IDs on PubChain.
9score Si of paper i. First, we normalize the scores Wi,j of
review Ri,j given by the readers as:
W˜i,j =
Wi,j∑
j
Wi,j
(3)
for all j. The normalized score W˜i,j takes value between 0
and 1. Then, we compute Si as a weighted sum of scores Zi,j
given by reviewers to paper i using the normalized scores W˜i,j
as their weights:
Si =
∑
j
W˜i,jZi,j (4)
The computed Si is an evaluation on the quality of paper i
and is used to reward the author by the reward distribution
mechanism. In essence, the effective score Wi,j made by
readers to review Ri,j reflects the quality of that review and
is an indication of the extent to which readers agree with the
score Zi,j by reviewer j on paper i.
B. Simulation Investigations
We next present simulation results to validate that our
proposed decentralized scoring system can ensure fair reviews
of papers, even in the presence of adversary reviewers with a
biased interest.
Consider one poor-quality paper, paper i with a ground-truth
score of S. The author of this paper is an attacker who wants
to gain more rewards by controlling a set of malicious nodes
faking as reviewers and readers so that the paper can obtain
a much higher score S′  S on the platform. We assume
the scores {Zi,j}j for a paper i given by honest reviewers
are Gaussian distributed with mean S and variance σ2s . The
scores given by honest readers to a particular review j of
paper i are Gaussian distributed with mean WP − |Zi,j − S|
and variance σ2s , where WP is the mean score for a perfect
review that assigns the same score to the ground-truth score
(i.e., Zi,j = S).
We consider two strategies for the attacker. The first strategy
is to have all malicious nodes serve as reviewers of the paper.
All malicious nodes will give a high review score Zi,j = S′,
for all j ∈ MS, where j ∈ MS is the set of the malicious
nodes controlled by the attacker. In our simulations, we assume
there are totally 1000 review scores given by reviewers to
paper i, among which Nmn scores are given by the malicious
nodes. We assume each review Ri,j = (Zi,j , Ci,j) is scored by
Nrs honest readers. Then, the effective score Wi,j of review
Ri,j is obtained by first excluding the highest and lowest
10% scores from Nrs readers’ scores and then averaging the
remaining scores. Finally, we compute the final score Si of
paper i according to (3) and (4). The results are shown in
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, where the final scores Si are evaluated with
respect to different numbers of malicious nodes Nmn. We treat
the simple average of the review scores, i.e., Si =
∑
j Zi,j , as
our benchmark. In the simulations, we set S = 40, S′ = 80 ,
WU = 90 and Nrs ∈ {10, 100, 300, 600}. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7
show the results for σ2s = 10, and σ
2
s = 100, respectively. As
we can see, our scoring method is robust to the attackers fake
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Fig. 6. The curve of Si vs. Nmn with σ2s = 10 for the first attack strategy.
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Fig. 7. The curve of Si vs. Nmn with σ2s = 100 for the first attack strategy.
reviews. When more and more malicious nodes are involved
(large Nmn), the attacker becomes more successful in biasing
the score toward the fake score. Large readership on the
PubChain platform means large Nrs , and large Nrs makes
the system more robust against large Nmn.
The second strategy is to have a fraction δ of the malicious
nodes be fake reviewers and the rest be fake readers; and half
of the fake readers will support the fake reviews by giving
high scores, and the other half of the fake readers will attack
the honest reviews by giving them low scores. For example,
suppose that there are Nmn = 100 malicious nodes and δ =
0.1. Then, 10 of the malicious nodes are fake reviewers that
give review score S′ to paper i and 90 malicious nodes are
fake readers that can give a total of 90Nrc fake scores to all
reviews of paper i. Among the 90Nrc fake scores to reviews,
45Nrc scores of VU are given to the fake reviews put up by
the attacker (each of the 10 fake reviews is assigned with
45Nrc/10 scores of VU ), where VU is a very high score used
to support the fake reviews ; 45Nrc scores of VL are given
10
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Fig. 8. The curve of Si vs. Nmn with Nrs = 10 for the second attack
strategy.
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Fig. 9. The curve of Si vs. Nmn with Nrs = 40 for the second attack
strategy.
to the honest reviews (each honest review is assigned with
45Nrc/90 scores of VL), where VL is a very low score used
to attack these honest reviews.
In the simulation, we set S = 40, S′ = 80 , WP = 90,
VL = 20, VU = 100, Nrc = 4, δ ∈ (0.1 , 0.2, 0.5}. Fig. 8
and Fig. 9 show the results for Nrs = 10, and Nrs = 40,
respectively. From the results, we can observe that with large
Nrs, our scoring method is still robust to this attack strategy.
VI. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype for the
PubChain platform. The implementation of the blockchain
reuses Ethereum, which means we can realize the virtual
machine layer of PubChain using the EVM smart contract
mechanism. The prototype uses IPFS for the storage layer.
We have deployed the PubChain interface to a network node
with address http://120.78.71.240:3000/. Users (i.e., publica-
tion players) can use the JSON-RPC protocol to remotely
deploy and invoke smart contract via this network node to
conduct their activities on PubChain.
Algorithm 1 Smart Contract for Posting Papers
1: struct Paper{
2: string ownership;
3: string paperName;
4: string paperHash;
5: string paperKeywords;
6: }
7: function stringsEqual(string storage a, string memory
b) internal view returns (bool) {
8: bytes storage a = bytes( a);
9: bytes memory b = bytes( b);
10: if (a.length != b.length)
11: return false;
12: for (uint i = 0; i ¡ a.length; i ++) {
13: if (a[i] != b[i])
14: return false;
15: return true;
16: }
17: }
18: function storeData(string userName , string paper-
Name , string paperHash , string paperKeywords ) pub-
lic {
19: require(!stringsEqual(paperInfo[paperName ].paperName,
paperName ) && !stringsE-
qual(paperInfo[paperName ].paperHash, paperHash ),
”one paper one upload”);
20: paperInfo[paperName ] = Paper({
21: ownership: userName ,
22: paperName: paperName ,
23: paperHash: paperHash ,
24: paperKeywords: paperKeywords ,
25: });
26: function getPaperHash(string paperName ) public view
returns (string) {
27: return paperInfo[paperName ].paperHash;
28: }
29: function getPaperOwnership(string paperName ) public
view returns (string) {
30: return paperInfo[paperName ].ownership;
31: }
32: }
With smart contracts, we have implemented the functions
of paper posting, paper reviewing, review scoring. The script
codes of smart contracts are stored on blockchain. The smart
contracts are triggered by transactions sent sent to their address
on blockchain. Algorithm 1 shows the script codes of the
smart contract that implements the function of paper posting.
To post a paper on PubChain, an author needs to carry
out the following procedure: 1) upload the paper (possibly
including some program codes, multimedia materials) with
her/his signature to the IPFS system and obtain the IPFS
address of this paper (i.e., the paper hash); 2) include the
publication information about the paper, i.e., its ownership
(the address of the author on blockchain), IPFS address, paper
11
Fig. 10. The window of Remix Ethereum IDE after the paper posting smart
contract is triggered by a transaction that posts our paper to the Ethereum
testnet.
title, key words, etc.) into a paper metadata record; 3) pack the
metadata of the paper to a transaction; 4) issue the transaction
to the blockchain system. After the smart contract receives
the transaction, it can be executed by some miner to write the
metadata of the paper to the blockchain. Fig. 10 shows the
window of Remix Ethereum IDE [20] after the paper posting
smart contract is triggered by a transaction that posts our paper
to the deployed Ethereum testnet. The procedures and smart
contracts for other functions are designed and implemented in
similar ways.
Currently, we have not implemented the proposed incen-
tive mechanism that requires extensive modifications on the
blockchain program codes. This is the most important part of
our follow-up work.
VII. CONCLUSION
To overcome the drawbacks and limitations of existing
publication platforms for research papers, we exploit recent
advances in decentralized technologies (i.e., blockchain, IPFS)
to design a decentralized open-access publication platform
named PubChain. Compared with the existing centralized
publication platforms, PubChain has several advantages: (i)
PubChain breaks the pay wall imposed by publishers so that
everybody can enjoy free access to papers. (ii) PubChain
eliminates undesired effects of information islands and has
the potential to become a unified database for global sharing
and recording of papers. (iii) PubChain, as a decentralized
system, provides uninterrupted service without single points
of failure. (iv) PubChain incentivizes participants to make
positive contributions to the platform with an incentive scheme
implemented over blockchain technology.
Importantly, unlike many other publication platforms, Pub-
Chain is not meant to be a profit-oriented platform. The
donation of cryptocurrency injects initial financial values to
Pubchain. We propose to use a two-way pegging technique
to lock donated cryptocurrency to a special address of the
parent chain that cannot be spent by any individual address.
The project development team, as volunteers, will not receive
any cryptocurrency
This project will be successful only if it can recruit the
participation of authors, reviewers, and readers who believe
in the tenet of free dissemination and free open access to
timely research results. We invite more volunteers to join the
project and work with us to improve the design of Pubchain,
and to serve as advocates for the new way of knowledge
dissemination for the benefit of humanity.
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